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Introduction 
 
This background paper shows trends on economic inequalities, socio-economic 
exclusion and insecurity, and a civic dimension of democratization. Whereas 
most of these variables can be considered as measures of democratic 
performance, the last mentioned may be more suitably seen as a civic measure of 
legitimization of democratization. 
 
The inequalities concern income and other labour market inequality trends. The 
social measures, of exclusion and insecurity, assess the extent to which people 
are being treated unequally, their social exclusion and the extent of insecurity 
they experience.  Finally, the data and trends in these performance dimensions of 
democratization are complemented with data on a legitimization dimension of 
democratization, namely how people respond to these threats to democracy and 
development through various forms of civic action. 
 
The data on the labour market dimensions come from the ILO. The data on the 
social dimensions are from the online database Indices of Social Development1, 
made available by the Institute of Social Studies (www.IndSocDev.org). The 
database stresses dimensions of development that have hitherto been under-
valued or were often not measured explicitly. For example dimensions of 
empowerment, social cohesion, participation, and equality as intrinsic parts of 
social development. The comparison of indices between 2000 and 2010 will be 
done for the same countries per index. The individual countries listed may vary 
per index, but for each index, the same countries will be listed for 2000 and 
2010, so that counties for which data is available for only one of these years will 
not be included. 
 
Finally, this background paper will engage in a brief discussion on how 
democratization may be furthered through strengthening the social dimensions 
of democratic performance and legitimization: intergroup cohesion, 
interpersonal safety and trust, and civic activism. 
 
 
Labour Market Inequalities under Globalization  
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall brought scholars as Francis Fukuyama(1992)  to 
declare the end of history: democratic free market thinking has gained the 
ideological battle forever. John Williamson (1989) published for the first time his 
ideas of a ‘Washington Consensus’- a list of policy recommendations for 
developing countries manly based on experiences with structural adjustment 
programmes in Latin America at the end of the eighties. Banks in the USA gained 
more freedom as the Clinton Administration repealed the Glass-Steagal act in 
1999. Internationally, the IMF and World Bank, supported by the USA and 
European governments flexed their muscles for liberalization of the capital 
market. The percentage IMF member states, both developed and developing 
member states that removed restrictions on capital flows increased strongly 
between 1990 and 2004 ( van der Hoeven and Lübker 2007). The USA did not 
only push for clauses on ‘decent work’ in trade agreements with many countries, 
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but also for capital market liberalization. In the beginning of the 21st century free 
capital should become the engine for substantial growth and progress of nations: 
Financialization became ‘the only game in town’ (Schiller 2003). 
 
What was the result? In any case not higher economic growth as was promised 
(Freeman 2010). On the contrary: growth took place mostly in countries, which 
participated in globalization, but on their own terms, with continuing 
restrictions on capital flows en with political decisions which were often not 
those of the Washington Consensus. An example is the steady growth in a.o. 
India, China and Brazil.  Financialization has almost thrown the rest of the world 
in a deep financial, economic and social hole. Despite courageous promises by 
national and international policy makers after the crisis in 2008 the beacons 
have not yet changed. In 2012 a second crisis or recession cannot be excluded. 
 
The continuing globalization and especially the financial globalization has a 
major influence on work, work conditions and work security of workers all over 
the world. Globalization makes the power lines and tensions that dominate the 
national and international labour markets clear and sharpens the contrast 
between workers, which profit from globalization and those who have 
difficulties to make ends meet. 
 
The nature of work changes: More flexible work in developed countries and 
continuing sometimes even increasing informal work in many developing and 
emerging countries. There is more work in some of the fast growing countries, 
but its remuneration and the security it offers is very unequally distributed. 
Averages of wellbeing in countries hide often more than they reveal: most poor 
people don’t live anymore in poor countries. 
 
 
Trends in labour markets 
 
Since the beginning of financial globalization at least eight important 
(international) labour market trends are noticeable (van der Hoeven 2010).  
 
1. Lower employment to population ratio’s. The Asian and Sub Saharan 
African regions had the highest employment to population ratio but since 1990 
this is declining. The only region where the ratio increased – because of 
increased female employment to population ratio- from an extreme low to a 
somewhat higher level are the Middle East and North Africa regions.  
 
2. A shift from employment in industry to employment in services. Globally the 
share of employment in services increased from 33.5 to 43.5%. And in the 
developed regions even from 61 to 71%. There is however an important 
distinction between services in developing and developed countries: In the first 
group of countries activities in the informal sector, with low value added, are 
often an important component of the service sector.  
 
3. More precarious work. This a noticeable trend both in developed and 
developing countries: in developed countries it takes the form of temporary 
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contracts, often for less than 40 hours a week. For example in Europa 70% of the 
working population between 25 and 49 years cannot find a permanent job; they 
work involuntarily in temporary or part-time jobs (ILO 2011, p.23). In 
developing countries precarious work takes the form of a relative big informal 
sector, which, against earlier expectations, is not getting smaller soon.  
 
4. Continuing or increasing youth unemployment. In many regions in the 
world youth unemployment is high, on average two and a half times as high as 
for other age groups. The highest rate of youth unemployment is in the Middle 
East and North Africa, where 25 per cent or more of all youth don’t have a job. In 
countries with lower youth unemployment it is nevertheless often difficult for 
youth to find a decent job. In the European Union the first job is often a part-time 
job or a job without any form of social security. 
 
5. Enterprises become transnational, production processes change. At the 
moment there are about 82,000 transnational enterprises with 810,000 partners 
over the whole world. Exports of these enterprises are grown from a quarter to 
one third of all worlds’ exports. Also employment in these enterprises has grown 
fast to about 100 million workers Trade now mainly takes place between 
subsidiaries of these enterprises which form parts of global production chains 
with special production techniques.  
 
6. Migration.  Globalization also has effected migration but to a lesser extent. 
Global figures about migration don’t show a rising trend (migrants form about 
2.7 per cent of the world population) but there are nevertheless regional shifts. 
In Europe the share of migrants increased from 3% in 1960 to 8.8% in 2005, in 
the USA from 6.75% to 13.8% and in Oceania from 13.5% to16. 4%. The biggest 
increase was in Gulf States from 4.9% to 37.1%. In regions with a rapid increase 
in migration one observes increasing social tension, but ‘remittances’ are often 
an important source of income for sending countries.  
 
All these above mentioned trends above have led to a weakening of the position 
of most workers and their families in the global economy. This weakening is 
furthermore evident from two further trends that characterize labour market 
developments since the 1990’s . 
 
7. A decreasing labour share in national income.  
Wage share declined over 1995-2007 in two thirds of the developing countries, 
including the major ones, as well as in the major developed countries (ILO, 2008 
and Figure 1). The only exception was the Latin American region, where some 
countries witnessed an increasing wage share. ILO (2008) attributes the 
declining wage share to increasing trade and globalization and confirms earlier 
research findings (see Diwan 2001 and Harrison 2002) that, contrary to the 
conventional wisdom that sees the labour share in GDP as relatively constant, 
the proportion of GDP that goes into wages and other labour income varies over 
time. Using a data set from 1960 to 1997, Harrison (2002) show that, in the 
group of poorer countries, labour’s share in national income fell on average by 
0.1 percentage point per year from 1960 to 1993. The decline in the labour share 
accelerated after 1993, to an average decline of 0.3 percentage points per year. 
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In the richer sub-group, the labour share grew by 0.2 percentage points prior to 
1993, but fell by 0.4 percentage points per year since then. Thus there was a 
trend reversal for richer countries post-1993, and an acceleration of an already 
downward trend for the poorer sub-group. Harrison (2002) found that frequent 
exchange rate crises lead to declining labour shares,2 suggesting that labour pays 
a disproportionately high price when there are large swings in exchange rates 
(i.e., wages are more severely affected than GDP). Capital controls are associated 
with an increase in the labour share ( an effect that Harrison attributes to the 
weaker bargaining position of capital vis-à-vis labour, i.e. the cost of relocating 
production increases with capital controls). Foreign investment inflows are also 
associated with a fall in the labour share. The weak bargaining position of labour 
in contexts of open capital accounts is also a causal mechanism explored by Lee 
and Jayadev (2005). They find that financial openness exerts a downward 
pressure on the labour share both in developed and developing countries for the 
period from 1973 to 1995. Harrison also finds that increasing trade is associated 
with a fall in the labour share. This result is robust across specifications. Recent 
research by the ILO (2011) shows that in countries with a high degree of 
openness the wage share  has declined three times more than in countries with a 
low degree of openness (Figure 2).  These results point to a systematic negative 
relationship between various measures of globalization and labour’s share in 
GDP.  
 
 
Figure 1: Increasing and declining (75% countries) wage share 1995-2007 
 
Source: ILO (2008). 
 
  
Increasing  Decli ing  (75 % Countri ) wageshare 
1995-2007
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Figure 2: Changes in Wage Share and openness 
Source ILO (2011). 
 
8. Increasing wage differentiation  
 
However not only has the inequality between wages and other components of 
gross domestic product increased, but the distribution among wage earners has 
also worsened. The ratio of the average wage of the top ten per cent wage 
earners in relation to the bottom ten per cent is found to have increased in 
seventy per cent of the countries (Figure 3). Here also, one notices similar 
regional differences, an almost uniform pattern for most regions, but a mixed 
pattern for Latin America. This growing dispersion between wages and the 
decline in wage share in general has contributed to growing inequality in most 
countries. 
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Figure 3: Growing inequality in 70% of countries, inequality between top and 
bottom wage earners has increased since 1995 
Source: ILO (2008). 
 
There is also evidence that growing inequality is leading to instability and 
insecurity. ILO (2011) shows that countries with higher inequality have a larger 
risk of social unrest (Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4. Income Inequality associated with risk of social unrest. 
 
 
Source:  ILO, 2010, figure 2.6 
 
 
All these trends presented above make that the global labour market today is 
rather different than that of 30 years ago. An important factor in all this is 
Growing inequality 
In 70% of countries, inequality between top and bottom wage 
earners has increased since 1995
Wage inequalities
= more inequality
= less inequality
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growing inequality. Also the definition of work is changing. The continuing 
poverty, also for families where all family members work, has led to the concept 
of ‘working poor’: work that does not generate sufficient income to live from and 
to place one’s family above the poverty line. UNDP and ILO use statistics to 
measure he quality of work (ILO, Global Employment trends, yearly). The World 
Bank distinguishes between: good jobs, bad jobs’ (Bourguignon, 2005; World 
Bank, 2012) largely based on income criteria. The ILO goes further and uses 
decent work, where work is approached from four vantage points: employment, 
labour rights, social security and social dialogue. When the concept was 
introduced it was the intention to construct a decent work index (Ghai, 2003), 
but as different members of the ILO Governing Body could not agree on the 
precise elements of an index and the measurement and weighting factors of 
these, the index was never introduced. Progress is in decent work is now 
analyzed through yearly thematic reports at the International Labour 
Conference, but through a composite index. 
 
 
The crisis of 2008 and labour markets 
 
The crisis of 2008 had major consequences for labour markets all over the world. 
In developing countries, employment in the export sectors decreased with 
negative consequences for other sectors in the economy. Studies of earlier 
‘business cycles’ and earlier financial crises (Reinhard and Rogoff, 2009) have 
demonstrated that employment recovered more slowly and to a lesser degree 
than other economic variables (‘jobless recovery’). This was also the case with 
the crisis of 2008. However this crisis was different because the boom before the 
crisis already produced less decent jobs than normally would have been 
expected. On top of that the very fragile recovery phase is characterized by a 
slow growth in decent jobs (Ghosh, 2011). This was and is of great consequence 
for millions of families all over the world (Green and King 2011).  
 
In comparison with the 1930’s it could however even been worse (Torres, 2010). 
Many governments took, right after the outbreak of the crisis robust measures to 
avoid a repeat of the experiences of the 1930’s. Countries that had the fiscal 
space decreased taxes to stimulate demand. This amounted to 1.7% of world 
GDP. A joint monetary policy resulted in historically low interest rates Banks 
were massively supported by their governments. The bill for the USA and Europe 
was $ 11.5 trillion, about a sixth of World GDP. These measures supported the 
economy and according to the ILO helped to save about 20 million jobs. Some 
countries also used their stimulus measures to expand their system of social 
security (Brazil, India), to increase or extend unemployment benefits (Japan, 
USA) and to implement working time reductions (France, Germany, 
Netherlands).  
 
The crisis of 2008 and its consequences could have therefore been a signal to 
arrest the globalization trends indicated above and to arrive at a more stable and 
fair economic development, for the crisis in 2008 was too a very large extend the 
consequence of financial globalization and the ensuing increase in inequality, 
which indebted for example many American families. As the governments of 
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developed and of developing countries forcefully stimulated the economy and 
supported their banks to avoid a massive depression, one could have expected 
also stronger measures to combat the deeper causes of the crisis, particularly 
financial globalization and growing income inequality. In the first phase of the 
crisis this hope was frequently expressed (van der Hoeven, 2010) but soon it 
turned out that the political constellation was not (yet) mature enough to 
intervene more vigorously. It are therefore the poorer groups that are often hit 
double or trice (see Table 1). First because they did not profit from the boom 
leading up to the crisis, secondly because they were hit by the crisis and third 
because they suffer from lower public spending, especially in social areas; a 
consequences of fiscal tightening to lower public budget deficits, which were 
largely caused by support to the banking system and stimulus measures.  
 
 
Table 1. Effects on various socioeconomic groups in different countries. 
 
 
Source: Bergeijk, de Haan and van der Hoeven, 2011, table 1.1 
 
 
Globalization and Financialization: asymmetry between capital and labour 
 
It is clear that many feel the threat of globalization for decent work. In recent 
surveys people in developing and in developed countries clearly indicated what 
concerns them most: work and work for their children. Why have politicians or 
the political system often not taken these concerns seriously? Why is the concern 
that so many people have for a decent job neglected in politicians mind? Why 
could governments (rightfully) act as bankers of last resort, which engaged 
trillions of dollars, but could government not act as employer of last resort? Why 
such an asymmetric approach to capital and labour? 
 
A first reason is ideological: The thinking of a broad group of politicians, both in 
developing and in developed countries is still based on neo-classical thinking 
that was the basis for the earlier mentioned Washington Consensus: Trust 
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financial and economic markets and make labour market more flexible. A second 
reason is that political parties are afraid to put employment central. They are 
afraid to fall back to class antagonism or afraid to be regarded as old fashioned. A 
third reason is that continuing liberalization is a political easy solution. It 
requires less: less public sector which acts reactive, spend money to keep up the 
financial system and translates social policies to safety nets. Attention for work 
and for decent work requires however more attention from their government en 
requires in these times of globalization greater policy coherence between almost 
all aspects of socio-economic policy: Macroeconomic policy, sectoral and 
structural policies, education policies and social security policies. This requires 
that attention for work and especially decent work is not only of concern to the 
ministry of labour – in many countries, especially in developing countries a weak 
ministry – but gets attention at the highest political level. International financial 
agencies should not only be accountable how they contribute to growth and 
stability but also how much decent jobs have been created3.  
 
It is imperative to have an integrated and global vision on labour markets. It is 
nonsense to speak of a national labour market. But this requires another way of 
thinking. Blue prints are not available, but if rethinking does not start now it 
could be too late. The world is changing very rapidly in the context of 
globalization.  
 
 
Social Exclusion of women and minorities 
This section will show trends in two indices of social exclusion: gender and 
minorities. The Gender Equality Index (GEI) measures the extent of gender 
equality in countries. Gender Equality refers to the extent to which women and 
men face the same opportunities and constraints within families, the workplace, 
and society at large. Gender equality is multifaceted, sustained by both social 
attitudes – for example, norms of fairness among employers, educators, and 
spouses – and social outcomes, such as the presence of women in managerial 
positions, educators, and legislators. The GEI is constructed from 21 indicators in 
the areas of economic life, education, health, rights and cultural beliefs. Table A1 
in the annex provides an overview of its indicators and their sources. They 
include subjective indicators, measuring the extent to which people adhere to 
gender stereotypes and discriminatory social norms and practices. They also 
include objective indicators measuring actual differences in male and female 
access or performance, such as in schooling, wages or health. 
Diagram 1 below shows that the trend in GEI over the decade 2000-2010. The 
trend indicates that gender equality has improved at the global level for 179 
countries. The increase has been particularly stark for countries that had 
relatively low levels of gender equality in 2000: at the left-hand side, the 
difference between the 2000 and 2010 score is bigger than on the right hand 
side. The overall average improvement of the index is from 0.64 to 0.75, which is 
an increase of 18%. 
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Diagram 1. Trend of gender equality at global level, 2000 and 2010 
 
Source: www.indsocdev.org accessed 19 November 2012. 
 
Diagram 2 compares the trend in GEI in five geographical regions in the world: 
Asia, Africa, Central Asia & the Middle East, America and Europe. The diagram 
shows that the global trend of improvement in gender equality between 2000 
and 2010 is reflected in all regions. The improvement of the index is, however, 
not equally distributed over the world. The smallest improvement was in Europe 
(11%), where the GEI already had high values in 2000. The biggest improvement 
is in Africa, with an increase in the GEI of 22% between 2000 and 2010. The 
trends therefore show a convergence towards higher levels of gender equality 
worldwide. 
 
 
Diagram 2. Trend of gender equality for five regions, 2000 and 2010 
 
Source: www.indsocdev.org accessed 19 November 2012. 
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The second index that measures social exclusion is the Inclusion of Minorities 
Index (IMI). This index measures levels of discrimination against vulnerable 
groups such as indigenous peoples, migrants, refugees, or lower caste groups. 
This measure focuses upon whether there is a systemic bias among managers, 
administrators, and members of the community in the allocation of jobs, benefits, 
and other social and economic resources regarding particular social groups. It 
includes indicators based on direct measurement of social institutions and their 
outcomes, and perception-based indicators, based on assessments by public 
opinion surveys, private agencies and non-governmental organizations, and 
proxy measures to measure the access to jobs and educational attainment. Table 
A2 in the annex provides an overview of all indicators and their sources. 
 
Diagram 3 below shows the global trend between 2000 and 2010 in the inclusion 
of minorities for 85 countries. First, we observe that the average score in the 
index has declined (from 0.50 to 0.48). This means, that the world has shown a 
worsening of the inclusion of minorities of 4%. Second, the diagram shows that 
this was largely the case for countries that had already in 2000 a low score. The 
decade 2000-2010, hence, shows that in many countries around the world, 
minorities are increasingly excluded from society. 
 
 
Diagram 3. Trend of inclusion of minorities at global level, 2000 and 2010 
 
Source: www.indsocdev.org accessed 19 November 2012. 
 
Diagram 4 shows that the decrease in the Inclusion of Minorities Index occurred 
in all regions, except for Europe where it remained stable. The biggest decline 
was in Africa, with 10%. Interestingly, this is the region with the highest 
improvement in gender equality, as diagram 2 has shown above, which is a stark 
contrast. 
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Diagram 4. Trend of inclusion of minorities for five regions, 2000 and 2010 
 
Source: www.indsocdev.org accessed 19 November 2012. 
 
 
Comparing the trends in gender equality and inclusion of minorities we find that 
gender equality has improved but inclusion of minorities has worsened over the 
decade 2000-2010. Hence, an improvement of women’s position relative to 
men’s does not necessarily imply an improvement of the position of minorities in 
societies. The results for social exclusion are therefore mixed. Not so much 
between regions, because trends are quite similar across the world. But the 
difference is between gender and minorities as measures of exclusion – between 
a global rise in the first and a global decline in the second.  
 
 
Insecurities 
 
In this background paper, we use two measures of insecurity. The fist one is the 
Intergroup Cohesion Index (ICI). Intergroup cohesion refers to relations of 
cooperation and respect between identity groups in a society. Where this 
cooperation breaks down, there is the potential for conflictual acts such as 
ethnically or religiously motivated killing, targeted assassination and 
kidnapping, acts of terror such as public bombings or shootings, or riots 
involving grievous bodily harm to citizens, with concomitant effects upon growth 
and development. Social cohesion and conflict operate below the level of formal 
state institutions - albeit in implicit relationship to long-term political objectives 
and grievances - and can involve a diverse range of actors such as organized 
criminal groups, international terrorist networks, and ethnic or religious 
supremacist movements, as well as a diverse range of targets, including judges, 
public intellectuals, and ordinary citizens. Hence, intergroup cohesion is 
indirectly related to democratic governance. The Intergroup Cohesion Index uses 
data on inter-group disparities, perceptions of being discriminated against, and 
feelings of distrust against members of other groups. The index also includes 
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data on the number of reported incidents of riots, terrorist acts, assassinations, 
and kidnappings; agency ratings on the likelihood of civil disorder, terrorism and 
social instability; and reported levels of engagement in violent riots, strikes, and 
confrontations. Table A3 in the annex shows the full list of indicators and their 
sources. 
 
The other measure of insecurity is the Interpersonal Safety and Trust Index 
(ISTI).  Interpersonal norms of trust and security exist to the extent that 
individuals in a society feel they can rely on those whom they have not met 
before. It measures the extent to which a polity succeeds in generating safety and 
trust among people. Where this is the case, the costs of social organization and 
collective action are reduced. Where these norms do not exist or have been 
eroded over time, it becomes more difficult for individuals to form group 
associations, undertake an enterprise, and live safely and securely. ISTI 
measures personal security and trust by using data on general social trust from a 
wide variety of surveys, indicators of trustworthiness such as reported levels of 
crime victimization, survey responses on feelings of safety and security in one’s 
neighbourhood, data on the incidence of homicide, and risk reports on the 
likelihood of physical attack, extortion, or robbery. Table A4 in the annex shows 
all the indicators and sources. 
 
Diagram 5 shows the global trend in Intergroup Cohesion between 2000 and 
2010. It shows, for 100 countries for which data are available for both years, a 
decline in the ICI of 11% over the period 2000-2010.  
 
 
Diagram 5. Trend of Intergroup Cohesion at global level, 2000 and 2010 
 
Source: www.indsocdev.org accessed 19 November 2012. 
 
 
The regional comparison in diagram 6 shows that the decline in Intergroup 
Cohesion was the case in every region. The smallest decline was 5% on the 
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American continent. The biggest decline was 17% in Central Asia & the Middle 
East. 
 
 
Diagram 6. Trend of intergroup cohesion for five regions, 2000 and 2010 
 
Source: www.indsocdev.org accessed 19 November 2012. 
 
 
The second measure for insecurity, Interpersonal Safety and Trust is shown in 
diagram 7. The data include 106 countries and show a marked decrease in 
interpersonal safety and trust over the first decade of the new millennium. The 
average decline is 16%. Diagram 8 shows how the five regions compare on this 
trend. Again, all regions show a decline. The decline is for all regions substantial, 
ranging from 12% in Europe to 22% in Africa.  
 
The two indices for insecurity, intergroup cohesion and interpersonal safety and 
trust, both show a clear decline over the 2000-2010 period. This decline is in all 
five regions of the world. The trend implies that the world has not become a 
safer place for people in the first decade of the new millennium.  
 
 
The next section shows the trend in people’s civic responses to the worsening 
trend in insecurity and the exclusion of minorities, and the wider context of 
socio-economic inequalities. 
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Diagram 7.  Trend of Interpersonal Safety & Trust at global level, 2000 and 2010 
 
Source: www.indsocdev.org accessed 19 November 2012. 
 
 
Diagram 8. Trend of Interpersonal Safety & Trust for five regions, 2000 and 2010 
 
Source: www.indsocdev.org accessed 19 November 2012. 
 
Civic Activism 
Civic activism refers to the social norms, organizations, and practices, which 
facilitate greater citizen involvement in public policies and decisions. These 
include access to civic associations, participation in the media, and the means to 
participate in civic activities such as nonviolent demonstration or petition. Civic 
activism is essential in ensuring that public institutions function democratically, 
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with participation and representation for all. Achieving accountable governance 
requires not only responsive elites, but also active citizens - and active citizens, 
in turn, require participation in civic associations, local and international, access 
to the media, and the means to engage in activities such as nonviolent 
demonstration or petition. The index for civic activism uses data on the extent of 
engagement in civic activities such as signing petitions or joining peaceful 
demonstrations, studies of the organization and effectiveness of civil society, 
access to sources of media information, levels of civic awareness and information 
of political matters and concerns, and the extent to which civil society 
organizations are connected to broader, international networks of civic 
activity. Table A5 in the annex shows the indicators for the Civic Activism Index 
and their sources. 
 
In this background paper, we use the Civic Activism Index as a measure of civic 
responses to the increased inequalities and insecurities of societies worldwide. 
Diagram 9 shows the global trend for 2000-2010 for 162 countries. Interestingly, 
we do see changes over the ten year period, but the average change is zero. Both 
in 2000 and 2010 the average score on this index was 0.50. The diagram 
indicates that for countries that had a low score for civic activism in the 
beginning of the period, the score has improved. For countries that had an above 
average score saw their ranking decline.  The regional breakdown will help us 
finding out where these opposite trends can be found: within each region, or 
across regions. 
 
 
Diagram 9. Trend of Civic Activism at global level, 2000 and 2010 
 
Source: www.indsocdev.org accessed 19 November 2012. 
 
Diagram 10 shows the regional breakdown for civic activism. The regional 
distribution of the scores over 2000 and 2010 shows the following picture. For 
Central Asia and the Middle East, there is no change in civic activism. For Europe 
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and the American continent, we see a decline, of respectively 4% and 3% in the 
Civic Activism Index. In Asia and Africa, the diagram shows an increase of, 
respectively, 2% and 5%. These are precisely the two regions with the lowest 
scores in the index in 2000, pictured at the lower half in diagram 9. The data 
period is too early to pick up an Arab Spring effect. But it does seem to signal a 
forebode of increased civic activity in the countries concerned in Northern Africa 
as well as for the civic unrest in Asian countries like Thailand, China and India. It 
is important to remind here that each data point includes years around the data 
year. So, the data for 2010 include measures for the years 2008-2012. But, due to 
the fact that the data were accessed in 2012 and that it often takes several 
months up to two years before statistics for a particular year become available, 
the 2010 data will largely cover the years 2008-2011 and not 2012. 
 
 
Diagram 10. Trend of Civic Activism for five regions, 2000 and 2010 
 
Source: www.indsocdev.org accessed 19 November 2012. 
 
 
The trend in civic action, as measured by the Civic Activism Index over the 
period 2000-2010 show actually a double trend: a decline in Europe and 
America and an increase in Asia and Africa. Obviously, this does not necessarily 
imply that civic responses to rising inequalities and insecurities were very 
limited in the other three regions. To the contrary, because the scores show that 
civic activism was at an absolutely higher level in these other regions than in 
Africa and Asia, both in 2000 and in 2010. What the trends do show, is that civic 
responses have increased over the years in Africa and Asia, whereas they have 
decreased or remained stable in the other three regions. 
 
A final observation is that, again Africa stands out. In civic activism, it shows the 
highest increase. So, the African continent shows the biggest improvement in 
gender equality, the most serious decline in the inclusion of minorities, and also 
the biggest decline in one of the two measures for insecurity (and the second 
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largest decline in the other insecurity index). At the same time, Africa exhibits 
the largest increase in civic activism, which we consider a civic response variable 
to the worsening trends of exclusion and insecurity. 
 
 
Towards Democracy and Human Rights through Civil Society 
 
In this section we will briefly review the findings from two quantitative analyses 
we have done earlier with the ISD database in relation to democracy. The 
literature on civic agency regards the power of civil society as a positive force for 
social change, including socio-economic development and democracy (Bowles 
and Gintis, 2002; Glasius, 2010; Fowler and Biekart, 2011; Woolcock 2011). A 
recent in-depth case study found clear positive links between the strength of 
civil society and the quality of democracy in three African countries (Robinson 
and Friedman, 2005).  
 
We have first done a cross-country bi-variate panel regression analysis for the 
relationship between freedom of press and democracy (Brinkhorst and van 
Staveren, 2012). We expect this civic legitimization dimension of 
democratization to be particularly relevant because it enables transparency and 
accountability of a democracy. We have used two explanatory variables. First, 
the Freedom House Index4 for press freedom, and second, the same Civic 
Activism Index as we used above, because the majority of its underlying 
indicators relate to the use that people make of the press to inform themselves of 
politics. The dependent variable is the Polity-2 variable of representative 
democracy of the Polity IV project5. For both bi-variate estimations over the 
period 1995-2010 the correlations show strong, positive and statistically 
significant results. The coefficients show that the increase in the quality of a 
democracy is even twice as much for the Civic Activism Index as compared to the 
Freedom of Press Index. So, press freedom and in particular the use people make 
of it in following politics and protesting seems a key precondition for 
democratization. The main weakness of this analysis is that we have not used 
control variables and only a weak technique to control for endogeneity, namely a 
time lag. It therefore remains possible, that there is a causal relationship from 
democracy to press freedom, and that other variables are more important for 
democratization than freedom of press. 
 
In another study, which we carried out for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(van Staveren and Webbink, 2012), we did a more elaborate analysis, taking into 
account other possible explanatory variables. We also used a more advanced 
technique to test for endogeneity, namely through Granger-inspired causality 
tests. In this study we used, among others, the Civic Activism Index and the 
Intergoup Cohesion Index. For democracy we used again the Polity-2 Index from 
the Polity IV project, of representative democracy, and the CIRI Physical Integrity 
and Rights Index6 as a measure of democratic performance on human rights. Our 
cross-country multivariate panel regression analysis for the period 1995-2010 
shows mixed results. Whereas we find a strong positive and statistically 
significant effect of the rule of law on democracy, we find a small and not 
statistically significant effect of civic activism on democracy. So, whereas the 
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correlation was strongly positive in the earlier study using a bi-variate 
technique, in the more advanced analysis using control variables, this is no 
longer the case. This result suggests that, although civic activism may be seen as 
a response to experienced worsening of inequality, exclusion and insecurity, that 
does not necessarily, on its own, help to build democratic institutions7.  
 
Our analysis with human rights as a measure of the performance of democracy 
shows no statistically significant effect of civic activism, but a moderate, positive 
and statistically significant effect of intergroup cohesion. This seems to suggest 
that for the human rights dimension of democratic performance, intergroup 
cohesion is a relevant and positive factor, even when we take other explanatory 
variables into account. 
 
The findings from the two quantitative analyses of determinants of democracy 
are only a first step into the analysis of these complex relationships. Much more 
research is necessary into the quantitative relationships between the strength of 
civil society and democracy. But the two exploratory studies we have done 
suggest that social and civic variables do have an influence on democratization. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The main implication of the increasing labour market inequalities is that work 
has to become central in national and international politics. It concerns in effect 
decent work, with labour rights, social security and social dialogue. In economic 
crises an emergency break is sometimes used to reduce labour rights and as such 
to create more employment. However research on fundamental labour rights –
elimination of child labour, freedom of association, social dialogue, equal 
treatment and remuneration for women and abolishment of forced labour, has 
shown that a positive correlation exists between economic development and 
fundamental labour rights (Berg and Kucera, 2008 and Ghose, Majid and Ernst, 
2008)  
 
But progress in labour rights in developed countries that are now integrated in 
the world market does not come automatically. It was the outcome of action by 
concerned citizens, trade unions and an engaged middle class. This will not be 
different in the future. International cooperation should therefore not only focus 
on integrating poor countries in the world economy and strengthening the 
position of the poor in those countries but also in strengthening groups which 
stand for an improvement in labour rights. International cooperation has to be 
placed in the context of increased solidarity.  
 
The conclusions on the trends in exclusion and insecurity are as follows. For 
exclusion, the trends are opposite: whereas gender equality is on the rise, 
inclusion of minorities is declining in every region of the world. For insecurity, 
the trends are negative for all regions: both intergroup cohesion and 
interpersonal safety & trust have declined. This means that inequality and 
exclusion trends can go simultaneously in different directions: improvement in 
one type of social variable does not guarantee improvement of all types of social 
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variables. For gender equality, a well-developed UN machinery exists. This has 
emerged from three major UN conferences on women (Nairobi, Mexico and 
Beijing), and the CEDAW convention and required reporting by countries. For 
minorities no comparable institutional framework exists. We advise that this will 
be developed in order to counter the global trend of more exclusion of 
minorities. 
 
Finally, the results for civic activism show two trends in this civic response 
variable of democracy. We see an increase in Africa and Asia and a decrease in 
Europe and America and no change in Central Asia and the Middle East. This 
suggests that there may be some global convergence in civic activism, and that 
there is already a civic engagement to address inequalities, exclusion and 
insecurities in those regions of the world where the trends in these areas are 
worst. This signals that democratization from the bottom-up is already a clear 
trend in those regions where it seems most needed. 
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Annex 1: Indicators in each Index of Social Development used in the study. 
Table A1. Indicators of the Gender Equality Index. 
Indicator  Source  
Percentage agreeing that a married man has a right to beat his wife and 
children  
Afrobarometer  
Percentage of respondents who tend to agree or strongly agree that 
'women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and 
should remain so'.  
Afrobarometer  
Percentage of respondents who tend to agree or strongly agree that 
'women should have the same chance of being elected to political office 
as men'.  
Afrobarometer  
Rating on level of women's economic rights  CIRI  
Rating on level of women's social rights  CIRI  
Ratio of average female to male wages, across all available labour 
categories  
International Labour 
Organisation  
Percentage of women who agree that women have the same chance as 
men to get a good job in their country  
Latinobarometer  
Percentage of women who agree that women have the chance to earn 
the same salary as men in their country  
Latinobarometer  
Percentage of women who agree that women have the same chance as 
men to get a good education in their country  
Latinobarometer  
Proportion of employers and managers who agree or strongly agree that 
when jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women  
World Values Surveys  
Proportion of those of voting age who agree or strongly agree that on the 
whole, men make better political leaders than women do  
World Values Surveys  
Proportion of parents who agree or strongly agree that a university 
education is more important for a boy than a girl  
World Values Surveys  
Proportion of employers and managers who agree or strongly agree that 
on the whole, men make better business executives than women do  
World Values Surveys  
Percentage of labour force that is female  
World Development 
Indicators  
Ratio of females among legislators, senior officials and managers  
International Labour 
Organisation  
Ratio of females in professional jobs  
International Labour 
Organisation  
Ratio between female and male primary school enrolment  
World Development 
Indicators  
Ratio between female and male secondary school enrolment  
World Development 
Indicators  
Ratio between female and male tertiary educational  enrolment  
World Development 
Indicators  
Ratio between adult female and male literacy rates  
World Development 
Indicators  
Ratio between adult female and adult male mortality rates  
World Development 
Indicators  
Source: www.indsocdev.org accessed 19 November 2012. 
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Table A2. Indicators of the Inclusion of Minorities Index 
 
Indicator Source 
Level of perceived discrimination among blacks and mulattos, among 
all those in country self-identifying into these groups  
Latinobarometer  
Proportion of the public reporting that they are affected by 
discrimination due to skin colour or discrimination as immigrants  
Latinobarometer  
Percentage citing "discrimination due to skin colour" and 
"discrimination against immigrants" affects me  
Afrobarometer  
Proportion of population reporting that their economic situation is the 
‘same’ as other ethnic groups in country  
Afrobarometer  
Proportion of population reporting that their political situation is the 
‘same’ as other ethnic groups in country  
Afrobarometer  
Proportion of population reporting that their ethnic group is ‘never’ 
treated unfairly in country  
Afrobarometer  
Rating on level of uneven economic development along group lines  Fund for Peace  
Level of ethnic tensions, International Country Risk Guide rating  
International Country 
Risk Guide 
Level of religious tensions, International Country Risk Guide rating  
International Country 
Risk Guide 
Proportion of the public who do not very much or not at all trust 
members of other religious groups  
World Values Surveys  
Proportion of the public who do not very much or not at all trust 
members of other nationalities  
World Values Surveys  
Proportion of the public citing “Being of the same social background” 
is very important or rather important for as successful marriage  
World Values Surveys  
Level of economic and political discrimination against minorities in 
country  
Minorities at Risk  
Proportion of the public who would reject members of another ethnic 
or caste group as neighbours  
World Values Surveys  
Proportion of the public who would reject immigrants or foreign 
workers as neighbours  
World Values Surveys  
Proportion of the public who would reject members of another 
religious group as neighbours  
World Values Surveys  
Proportion of the public who would reject other language group as 
neighbours  
World Values Surveys  
Proportion of the public who would reject Jews as neighbours  World Values Surveys  
Proportion of the public who would “Prevent Labour Immigration”  World Values Surveys  
Proportion of the public who are (strongly) against immigration 
(people of another race, from poorer countries)  
European Social Survey  
Proportion of the public who think “immigration is bad for economy”  European Social Survey  
Proportion of the public who think “immigration is bad for cultural life European Social Survey  
Proportion of the public who think “immigration makes country worse 
place to live”.  
European Social Survey  
Educational Disparity Ethnic Groups  Household surveys  
Occupational Disparity Ethnic Groups  Household surveys  
OECD, Foreign/Native Labour Participation, across all educations  OECD Factbook  
Source: www.indsocdev.org accessed 19 November 2012. 
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Table A3. Indicators of the Intergroup Cohesion Index. 
 
Indicator  Source  
Number of reported incidents of violent riots  Databanks  
Number of reported incidents of assassinations  Databanks  
Number of reported incidents of terrorist acts  Databanks  
Number of reported incidents of guerrilla activity  Databanks  
Economist Intelligence Unit rating on likelihood of violent 
demonstrations  
Economist Intelligence Unit  
Economist Intelligence Unit rating on potential for terrorist acts  Economist Intelligence Unit  
Rating on the ‘legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group 
paranoia’  
Fund for Peace  
Level of civil disorder, International Country Risk Guide rating  
International Country Risk 
Guide  
Level of internal conflict, International Country Risk Guide rating  
International Country Risk 
Guide  
Risk of terrorism, International Country Risk Guide rating  
International Country Risk 
Guide  
Level of ethnic minority rebellion in country  Minorities at Risk  
Source: www.indsocdev.org accessed 19 November 2012. 
 
Table A4. Indicators of the Interpersonal Safety & Trust Index. 
 
Indicator  Source  
Felt unsafe in home, proportion saying 'never'  Afrobarometer  
Had stuff stolen from home, proportion saying 'never'  Afrobarometer  
Been attacked, proportion saying 'never'  Afrobarometer  
Proportion of respondents who say that 'in general, most people 
can be trusted'  
Asian Barometer  
Proportion of respondents who say that most people try to be fair, 
rather than take advantage of you when given the chance  
Asian Barometer  
Economist Intelligence Unit rating on social distrust  Economist Intelligence Unit  
Percentage respondents feel 'very safe' or 'fairly safe' walking 
alone in their area after dark  
International Crime Victim Survey  
Percentage respondents feel 'very safe' or 'fairly safe' while at 
home after dark  
International Crime Victim Survey  
Percentage respondents who avoid places when they go out  International Crime Victim Survey  
Percentage respondents who take company with them when they 
go out  
International Crime Victim Survey  
Percentage respondents experienced a car theft in last 5 years  International Crime Victim Survey  
Percentage respondents experienced heft from car in last 5 years  International Crime Victim Survey  
Percentage respondents experienced damage to car in last 5 years  International Crime Victim Survey  
Percentage respondents experienced motor theft in last 5 years  International Crime Victim Survey  
Percentage respondents experienced burglary in last 5 years  International Crime Victim Survey  
Percentage respondents experienced attempted burglary in last 5 International Crime Victim Survey  
 26 
years  
Percentage respondents experienced garage theft in last 5 years  International Crime Victim Survey  
Percentage respondents experienced robbery in last 5 years  International Crime Victim Survey  
Percentage respondents experienced personal theft in last 5 years  International Crime Victim Survey  
Percentage respondents experienced sexual offence in last 5 years  International Crime Victim Survey  
Percentage respondents experienced assault in last 5 years  International Crime Victim Survey  
Interpol homicide rate  Interpol  
Interpol rape rate  Interpol  
Interpol rate of serious assault  Interpol  
Interpol rate of aggravated theft  Interpol  
Interpol rate of breaking and entering  Interpol  
Interpol vehicle theft rate  Interpol  
WHO homicide rate  World Health Organisation  
Respondent or someone in their family assaulted in the last 12 
months  
Latinobarometer  
Percentage of respondents who feel secure in the neighbourhood in 
which they live  
Latinobarometer  
Percentage of respondents who have been the victim of a street 
crime  
Latinobarometer  
Percentage of respondents who have been the victim of burglary  Latinobarometer  
Percentage of respondents who have been the subject of attempted 
homicide  
Latinobarometer  
Percentage of respondents who have been the subject of attempted 
abduction  
Latinobarometer  
State Department crime advisories, coded 1-5  US State Department  
UNCJIN homicide rate  
United Nations Criminal Justice 
Information Network  
Percentage of managers surveyed for whom crime is a major 
business constraint  
World Development Indicators  
Proportion of respondents who say that 'in general, most people 
can be trusted'  
World Values Survey, 
Afrobarometer, Latinobarometer  
Proportion of respondents who say that most people try to be fair, 
rather than take advantage of you when given the chance  
World Values Survey  
Proportion of respondents who do not very much or do not at all 
trust their neighbourhood  
World Values Survey  
Proportion of respondents who do not very much or do not at all 
trust people they know personally  
World Values Survey  
Proportion of respondents who do not very much or do not at all 
trust people they meet for the first time  
World Values Survey  
Source: www.indsocdev.org accessed 19 November 2012. 
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Table A5. Indicators of the Civic Activism Index 
Indicator Source 
Proportion of public who have listened to radio news ‘in the last 
day’ or ‘several times in the last week’  
Afrobarometer  
Proportion of public who have watched TV news ‘in the last day’ 
or ‘several times in the last week’  
Afrobarometer  
Proportion of public who have read newspaper news ‘in the last 
day’ or ‘several times in the last week’  
Afrobarometer  
Civicus civil society rating — Structure  Civicus  
Civicus civil society rating — Environment  Civicus  
Civicus civil society rating — Values  Civicus  
Civicus civil society rating — Impact  Civicus  
Radios per capita  
International Telecommunications 
Union  
Radios per household  
International Telecommunications 
Union  
Proportion of public who ‘have’ or ‘would be prepared’ to take 
part in a peaceful demonstration  
Latinobarometer  
Proportion of public who ‘have’ or ‘would be prepared’ to sign a 
petition  
Latinobarometer  
Respondent says they use the radio to inform themselves about 
politics  
Latinobarometer  
Respondent says they use the newspaper to inform themselves 
about politics  
Latinobarometer  
Respondent says they use the television to inform themselves 
about politics  
Latinobarometer  
Percentage of respondents who watch TV news a great deal or 
very much  
Latinobarometer  
Percentage of respondents who read newspaper news a great deal 
or very much  
Latinobarometer  
Percentage of respondents who listen to radio news a great deal or 
very much  
Latinobarometer  
Average number of days spent watching TV news, per week  Latinobarometer  
Average number of days spent reading newspaper news, per week  Latinobarometer  
Average number of days spent listening to radio news, per week  Latinobarometer  
Density of international organisation secretariats of international 
non-governmental organisations in given country  
Global Civil Society Project  
Extent to which organisations and individuals in each country are 
members of INGOs, number of INGOs with members in that 
country  
Global Civil Society Project  
Percentage of the workforce employed in the NGO sector  SAIS  
Newspapers per capita  UNESCO  
Proportion of respondents who either 'have done' or 'might' sign a 
petition  
World Values Surveys, 
Latinobarometer  
Proportion of respondents who either 'have done' or 'might' join a 
boycott  
World Values Surveys  
Proportion of respondents who 'have done' or 'might' attend a 
peaceful demonstration  
World Values Surveys, 
Afrobarometer, Latinobarometer  
Proportion of respondents who have used a daily newspaper in the World Values Surveys  
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last week to find out what is going on in the world  
Proportion of respondents who have used news broadcasts on 
radio or TV in the last week to find out what is going on in the 
world  
World Values Surveys  
Proportion of respondents who have used printed magazines in 
the last week to find out what is going on in the world  
World Values Surveys  
Proportion of respondents who have used in depth reports on 
radio or TV in the last week to find out what is going on in the 
world  
World Values Surveys  
Proportion of respondents who have used books in the last week 
to find out what is going on in the world  
World Values Surveys  
Proportion of respondents who have used internet or email in the 
last week to find out what is going on in the world  
World Values Surveys  
Source: www.indsocdev.org accessed 19 November 2012. 
 
 
Annex 2: Indices of Social Development – an explanation. 
 
The aggregation method for the construction of the indices used is unique and different 
from that of most indices of development. It uses the matching percentiles method, 
which allows for an extensive and robust list of country data because it uses 10 to 30 
variables per index and runs 1000 rounds of ranking these variables into an index. The 
final ranking is the average ranking which is presented with a standard error, which 
indicates per country for each index the reliability of the index value. Each index is also 
tested for its distinctiveness form the others through principal component analysis. This 
is to ensure that there are no overlaps, either in variables or in meaning of these, and 
that each index is constructed of indicators that best belong to that particular index (de 
Haan et. al, 2011). 
 
The ISD indices are broad-based and therefore measuring relatively coherent trends, 
rather than ad hoc individual variables. This coherence has been demonstrated in a 
comparative analysis of one of the ISD indices, namely the Gender Equality Index (van 
Staveren, 2012). The comparison was with five other gender indices:  Gender Inequality 
Index of UNDP’s Human Development Report; Social Institutions and Gender Index of 
the OECD; Global Gender Gap Index of the World Economic Forum; and the Women’s 
Economic Opportunities Index by the Economic Intelligence Unit. The comparison has 
shown that the GEI correlates quite strongly with the four other gender indices but that 
it covers most broadly the four dimensions of human development: access to resources, 
asymmetric institutions, capabilities and achievements. Moreover, the calculation of the 
GEI uses a relatively strongly reliable method as compared to the other ones: the values 
are standardized and normalized and the index has less sample bias and less 
measurement error as compared to the methods used in the construction of the other 
indices, due to the matching percentiles method. Moreover, the female/male ratios in 
the GEI are capped to equality, not allowing compensation of female disadvantage in one 
variable with female advantage in another variable, which is allowed in some of the 
other gender indices. 
 
Obviously, the comparison of one of the ISD indices with other indices that measure the 
same variable does not provide information about the relative strength of the other 
indices. But it does give an idea about the relative strength of the method used in 
constructing the ISD database. 
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Annex 3: biggest changes in indices between 2000 and 2010 
 
GEI: All counties show an increase (average increase 18%). The table below shows the 
countries that experienced an increase of 25% or more. 
Country 
Change 
GEI>25
% 
Iraq 0,59 
Yemen, Rep. 0,52 
Equatorial Guinea 0,50 
Lesotho 0,44 
Chile 0,43 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0,42 
Morocco 0,39 
Niger 0,36 
Congo, Rep. 0,35 
Tonga 0,34 
Djibouti 0,33 
Suriname 0,33 
Philippines 0,31 
Maldives 0,31 
Malawi 0,30 
Kenya 0,30 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 0,30 
Liberia 0,29 
Mauritius 0,29 
Swaziland 0,29 
Central African Republic 0,29 
Gabon 0,28 
Nigeria 0,28 
Guinea-Bissau 0,28 
Jordan 0,28 
Eritrea 0,28 
Mali 0,27 
Oman 0,27 
Nepal 0,27 
West Bank and Gaza 0,27 
Algeria 0,27 
Haiti 0,26 
Grenada 0,26 
Vanuatu 0,26 
Chad 0,26 
Mexico 0,26 
India 0,26 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0,25 
Comoros 0,25 
Sao Tome and Principe 0,25 
Solomon Islands 0,25 
Sri Lanka 0,25 
Turkmenistan 0,25 
Zambia 0,25 
Bangladesh 0,25 
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IMI: The table below shows the countries that experienced an increase or decrease of 
10% or more. (The average decrease was 4%.) 
Country 
Change 
IMI>-
10% Country 
Change 
IMI>10
% 
Pakistan -0,30 Malta 0,10 
Nigeria -0,30 Romania 0,10 
Uganda -0,20 Hungary 0,10 
Bangladesh -0,18 Korea, Rep. 0,12 
China -0,15 Croatia 0,13 
Iraq -0,14 Guatemala 0,27 
Panama -0,14 
  Bolivia -0,14 
  Indonesia -0,13 
  Venezuela, RB -0,13 
  Botswana -0,13 
  Zimbabwe -0,13 
  Netherlands -0,12 
  Tanzania -0,12 
  Iran, Islamic Rep. -0,12 
  Paraguay -0,12 
  Ecuador -0,11 
  Sweden -0,11 
  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina -0,10 
  Russian Federation -0,10 
  El Salvador -0,10 
   
 
 
ICI: The table below shows increases of 10% and more and decreases of 20% and more 
(average decline: 11%). 
Country 
Change 
ICI>10% Country 
Change 
ICI>-20% 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 0,28 Egypt, Arab Rep. -0,20 
Angola 0,23 China -0,20 
Indonesia 0,19 Ethiopia -0,21 
Colombia 0,16 Sudan -0,24 
Algeria 0,13 Guinea -0,25 
  
Philippines -0,25 
  
Thailand -0,29 
  
Bangladesh -0,31 
  
Lebanon -0,33 
  
Nigeria -0,34 
  
Pakistan -0,35 
  
Somalia -0,50 
  
Iraq -0,75 
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ISTI: The table below shows decreases of 25% or more (average decrease was 16%). 
Country 
Change 
ISTI>-
25% 
Cote d'Ivoire -0,69 
Jamaica -0,55 
Pakistan -0,44 
Syrian Arab 
Republic -0,34 
Zambia -0,32 
Sri Lanka -0,31 
Cambodia -0,30 
Indonesia -0,30 
Venezuela, RB -0,30 
Zimbabwe -0,30 
Greece -0,27 
Dominican 
Republic -0,27 
Italy -0,25 
 
 
 
CAI: The table below shows changes of 10% and more and changes of 10% and less 
(from the average of 0%). 
Country 
Change 
CAI>10
% Country 
Change 
CAI<10
% 
Angola 0,28 Slovenia -0,10 
Bhutan 0,28 Serbia and Montenegro -0,10 
Kyrgyz Republic 0,18 Trinidad and Tobago -0,11 
Cape Verde 0,18 Slovak Republic -0,11 
Guinea 0,16 Ireland -0,11 
Nepal 0,15 Bahrain -0,12 
Haiti 0,14 Greece -0,13 
Mali 0,14 
  Ghana 0,14 
  Cambodia 0,13 
  Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 0,13 
  Niger 0,13 
  Madagascar 0,12 
  Gambia, The 0,11 
  Uzbekistan 0,11 
  Maldives 0,11 
  Lesotho 0,10 
  Congo, Dem. Rep. 0,10 
  Mongolia 0,10 
  Burkina Faso 0,10 
  Myanmar 0,10 
  Mozambique 0,10 
  Djibouti 0,10 
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Notes 
 
                                                        
1 The ISD database covers six indices for almost every country of the world that are based on 
over 200 measures from 25 reputable data sources. The six indices in the database are: inter-
group cohesion; civic activism; clubs & associations; interpersonal safety & trust; gender 
equality; and inclusion of minorities. The data is available for the years 1990 to 2010, 
constructed for five-year periods. 
2 Labour shares decreased with a real devaluation but in the recovery did not return to pre-
devaluation levels. 
3 International financial Institutions have become more sensitive to this issue see e.g. The 
Challenges of Growth, Employment and Social Cohesion, Joint ILO-IMF Conference in Cooperation 
with the Office of the Prime Minister of Norway, Bergen, 13 sept 2010) but at a country level this is 
often less noticeable.  
4 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press 
5 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
6 http://ciri.binghamton.edu/index.asp 
7 For the intergroup cohesion, we found, surprisingly, a negative effect on democracy, which was 
statistically significant. We were not able to explain that correlation. 
 
